The 8(a) Dustup
Lost in the recent noise and fighting around DEI and fraud in the SBA 8(a) program is a simpler question. Should the federal government keep one of the few procurement mechanisms that actually allows buyers and small businesses to talk to each other like adults and get deals done?
Last week, Secretary Hegseth took to the socials to tell the world how the SBA 8(a) program is “swamp code” for “DEI, race-based contracting” and that he was going to “take a sledgehammer” to the program with a “line-by-line review of every small business sole source, 8(a) contract that is over $20 million, and we’ll look at everything smaller than that too.”[1] At the heart of the audit is the intimation that sole-source contracts are ripe for fraud and enrichment of beltway bandits.
Similarly, the Small Business Administration has announced new guidance that reiterated its position of race neutrality for the 8(a) Program while celebrating the suspension of "1,000 contractors from participation in the 8(a) Program after they failed to submit the documents SBA requested [a month before]." Based on an earlier statement, the SBA is championing the suggestion that a lot of 8(a) companies are just "pass-through vehicle[s] for rampant abuse and fraud."
Predictably, various parts of the procurement community have come to the defense of the program, explaining (for example) that Hegseth’s concerns don’t seem to line up with the actual program requirements and noting that sole-source contracts are hardly limited to 8(a) recipients. Some observers go further, noting the very real political risks involved. And lawyers are revving their engines.
While the debate plays out, I still have the same question I had a few years ago when a court ruling put the 8(a) program “on pause”:
What would happen if the 8(a) program were to disappear or be materially changed. How would agencies handle the loss of directed awards? The program is liked by procurement professionals because it makes their lives easier. Taking it away means that contracting officers will have more work to do. No one wants that.
As I explained then, one of the primary features of the 8(a) program is the ability to do a directed award. With the 8(a) tool removed from the contracting officer’s toolbox, coupled with fewer contracting officers, we might expect slower procurement cycle times.
There’s another thing, though. The unique authority of the 8(a) program to skip competition and get directed awards might actually lead to better product choices by the government.
In startup circles, there’s a concept called “founder-led sales,” which is basically that successful startups should expect CEOs and founders to engage directly in selling to the customer because it helps provide early, critical feedback on product-market fit. Similarly, in corporate circles, there’s a concept called the “Challenger Sale”, which argues that “the secret to sales success for selling complex B2B solutions [is] challenging customers, not building relationships.”
In both cases, the key is that direct customer conversations are not just important for the seller but because they help deliver the right product to the customer.
For government, though? This sort of sales pattern is frowned upon. Instead of proactive pitches from industry, government buyers engage in various forms of reactive market research or, at best, attempts to create formal processes for pitches. To avoid appearance of impropriety or creating organizational conflicts of interest, government and industry are most certainly not engaging in negotiation before solicitation. Best to keep things in email or in RFI responses. And where large incumbents can invest in extensive capture and business development and marketing, smaller players have a much narrower field on which to play.
The sole-source-nature of the 8(a) program, then, is a rather unique exception to the pre-solicitation rule. Small businesses—and usually the founders of the small business—engage in direct negotiation with the government to figure out what’s best for both parties after the founders go through the rigamarole of meeting the government’s compliance requirements.
And that, in my mind, is a good thing.
That said, don't get it twisted. Let me be absolutely clear that, in my experience and estimation, there are definitely plenty of 8(a) companies that stink to high heaven. And I’m not certainly not blind to real concerns about shell corporations and pass throughs. As in any industry, and as in any government program, there will be fraudsters and rent seekers. There will also be well-intentioned companies that are bad at their jobs. There will be fraud, waste, and abuse. And we should applaud when government tries to responsibly address it.
I’m just making the point that the directed-award feature of the 8(a) program is something we might miss with a hyperfocus on fraud, waste, and abuse. After all, it's not like the beltway bandits will disappear if the 8(a) program goes away. It's not like the companies on the back end of the pass-through need the 8(a) program to sell to government. There may be a hidden cost of the 8(a) program, but there's also a real opportunity cost of getting rid of it.
And therein lies the paradox of the 8(a) program. The government doesn’t love 8(a) because of DEI or because it is a vehicle for fraud. The government loves 8(a) because it is an escape valve from its own worst impulses. Instead of hiding behind email and reverse industry days, under the 8(a) program, government folks and small-business founders can talk to each other and figure out what the government actually needs. Wild, I know.
In his speech, Secretary Hegseth claims that “America’s full of great, amazing small businesses” and that sledgehammering the 8(a) program is “part of a larger effort to transform our acquisition ecosystem into one that makes sense for the threats we face in the 21st century.”
Fine. But if I might be so bold, maybe the real reform shouldn’t be to eliminate the 8(a) program but to embrace the parts of it that work? If the government wants a buying experience that’s more in line with the private sector, the government should put less of a focus on competition as a way to eliminate fraud and put more ambition into better communication between government and the seller.
[1] I’m sorry. I just can’t help but imagine that the most lethal fighting force on the planet can surely wield a weapon more lethal than auditors to destroy a program? (“From the Halls of Montezuma to the Tabs of Spreadsheet E!”) Either way, here are the lyrics and video to Peter Gabriel’s 1986 classic “Sledgehammer,” which is excellent background music for article writing. You’re welcome.
GAO Protest Snippets
- If Part 13, then no debrief. Protestor filed a protest more than 10 days after a post-award brief explanation. Because the acquisition followed Part 13 procedures, not Part 15, no debrief was required and the protest was untimely. Also, in the govcon-time-is-a-flat-circle category: the solicitation was marked "urgent" with proposals due in 4 days, with "boots on ground" within 40 days. Curiously, the award notice came 6 months later, 211 days after the solicitation release. GAO: ASG Solutions Corporation d/b/a American Systems Group, B-424053 (Jan 16, 2026)
- Unconnected various arrows and unlabeled graphics. Protestor argued that agency's assessment of technical approach was flawed. GAO's view was that the protest was just "disagreement with the agency's evaluation judgment" and that the protestor's slides weren't sufficiently clear ("We likewise see no basis to fault the agency for not connecting various arrows and unlabeled graphics on one slide to various statements on subsequent slides"). Ergo, protest denied. GAO: H2 Technology Group, LLC, B-423777,B-423777.2 (Dec 15, 2025)
- If the RFP wants escalation rates, you need to include them or the agency will include them for you. Solicitation required that labor rates escalate each year in the period of performance. Protestor didn't include an escalation rate and agency applied a default rate. Protestor claimed this was unreasonable but GAO disagreed, noting that the solicitation required it. Also, protestor claimed a "bait and switch" in the awardee's staffing plan, but GAO found that the agency never took the bait. GAO: Imagine One Technology & Management, Ltd., B-422875.3,B-422875.4 (Jan 02, 2026)
- Halves and Halves Not. DLA planned to procure "423 coupling halves" using a "special emergency procurement authority" and set the procurement aside for small businesses. After a pre-award protest by Chase, DLA canceled the solicitation, and issued a second solicitation with a smaller request for 176 coupling halves. After DLA made an award, Chase protested again. DLA took corrective action to cancel the solicitation and award. GAO dismissed the protest of the second solicitation as academic. GAO also reaffirmed that "an agency may cancel a solicitation during the course of a protest," rejecting Chase's claims related to the first cancellation. GAO: Chase Supply, Inc., d/b/a Chase Defense Partners, B-424032 (Jan 20, 2026)
- Attempting to reason with the agency doesn't toll the protest clock. Agency provided a post‑award debriefing on April 16, 2025. Protestor didn't file a protest until September 29, 2025. Protestor claimed that its emails with the agency "stopped the clock." GAO says no dice; the 10-day protest window didn't toll. Dismissed. GAO: AlphaSpaces, B-423971,B-423971.2 (Jan 21, 2026)
- Misevaluated? Nah. Protestor argued that GSA "misevaluated" the awardee's proposal. GAO reviewed the record and found that, based on that record, GSA's evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation. Protest denied. Also, a case where the incumbent's past performance was determined to be "high risk" based on its failure to meet SLAs. Ouch. GAO: CWTSatoTravel, B-423181.2,B-423181.3,B-423181.4 (Dec 19, 2025)
- Lack of experience, even if not a weakness, can be dispositive. The Air Force solicited proposals for "fuel transportation services." After reviewing proposals, the Air Force picked the vendor with better experience with "aviation fuel" even though the solicitation required other fuels, too. GAO found that the protestor's lack of experience with aviation fuel was enough to make the award even if it wasn't considered a significant weakness or deficiency. And because it wasn't a weakness, Air Force wasn't required to raise it during discussions. Protest denied. GAO: Centerline Logistics Corporation, B-423838,B-423838.2 (Jan 07, 2026)
Other GovCon updates
- GSA publishes and RFI regarding ITVAR pricing. GSA posted an RFI today with an ultimate goal of "increas[ing] transparency in markups by VARs, which helps to dispel any notion of unfair pricing practices." Responses are due February 9, 2026. GSA: GSA Seeks Industry Ideas to Enhance Reseller Market Oversight and Value, Press Release (Jan 22, 2026)
- No race-based discrimination for SBA 8(a). New guidance from SBA on the 8(a) Program “reiterating” that the SBA “does not consider any business owner to be ‘socially disadvantaged’ — and therefore eligible to participate in the program – simply because they are a member of a certain minority group.” SBA: SBA Issues Clarifying Guidance That Race-Based Discrimination is Not Tolerated in the 8(a) Program, News Release (January 22, 2026)